Halacha and Chocolate

Halacha and Chocolate

By Yair Hoffman

Once upon a time, there were just flowers and wine. But now, a third option has boldly entered the Shabbos, Yom Tov, and general Simcha market - chocolate gift packs. The third option offers an amazing variety, and it’s under the Vaad too!

There are, in fact, two ways in which these gift packs can be purchased. There is the pre-packed method, which is generally much more expensive. And then there is the “make-your-own” method, which is less expensive, allows for personal creativity, and is loads of fun. Plus you get to watch them shrink wrap your creation and dress it up with a bow.

So what is the problem? Believe it or not, one must be extremely careful, because if not there is a whole host of prohibitions that one can violate in making your own gift pack.

The issue lies in the weighing.

As of this writing there are no signs on the store in question warning about how the chocolates are weighed and priced. The situation as it stands is fraught with halachic danger.

How so? Well, let’s say, for example, you purchased a $6.50 tray and went to fill up the three areas with various chocolates. At the top section you filled it with the $11.99 Swiss chocolates. You just took 3/10^th s of a pound of the Swiss chocolate one since they are pretty expensive. Then you took some of the $3.99 chocolate covered nuts. You got 1.2 pounds for that one. Then you took some $4.99 rum balls and took .9 of a pound on that one. The total should be $3.60 for the Swiss chocolate, $4.79 for the chocolate-covered nuts, and $4.49 for the rum balls. This adds up to $12.88 plus your $6.50 for the tray. Had you added them all up your expected total would have been $19.38, but who brings a calculator.

The problem is that this is not how the young lady behind the register will calculate it. Instead she will just average the total price of the chocolates [($11.99 + $3.99 + $4.99) divided by 3] and get the figure of $6.99. She will then multiply this figure by the total weight of all the chocolates – 2.4 pounds. The total you are now paying is $23.28 (including the container) almost $4 more than you would have paid had she weighed them separately.

Conversely, an unscrupulous chocolate lover could use this problem against the owners of the store. For example if you were to buy 3/10^ths of a pound of the $3.99 chocolate covered nuts and 1.6 pounds of the $11.99 Swiss stuff and them 1.3 pounds of the $12.99 cordials you’d only pay $30.90 for $37.27 worth of chocolate!

So who cares?

The Torah does. The Torah in Sefer VaYikra (19:35-36) tells us not to do an avel bamishpat referring to the proper use of measurements, and to use honest balances, honest weights, and honest dry and liquid measures. The purpose of this Torah commandment, of course, is to ensure that the purchaser receives and pays for the amount he thinks he or she has purchased. Even if a weight is off by only a small amount the verse in VaYikra is violated. These halachos are quantified in the Choshain Mishpat section of Shulchan Aruch (231:19).

Another issue is the one of Lifnei Iver – not placing a stumbling block before another person. The Torah (VaYikrah 19:14) states: “You shall not curse the deaf nor place a stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear your G-d - I am your L-rd.” Even if someone is inadvertently violating the prohibition against theft on account of you, you have placed a stumbling block in front of him.

While one may quibble about whether the violation of honest weights and measures is violated here, since there is nothing wrong with them per se, there clearly exists a violation of theft and of Lifnei Iver.

Of course this all is inadvertent, but that doesn’t really matter. Rashi on the verse in VaYikra labels the one who measures a “Dayan” a judge. He further writes that one who measures inaccurately is labeled with all the horrific appellations that apply to an unscrupulous judge. It causes the land to become impure; it causes Chilul Hashem, it removes the Shechina, it causes Israel to fall under the sword, and it causes Israel to be exiled from their land. As a judge who twisted things he is termed hated and an abomination.

Is there also a Lifnei Iver on Dina DeMalchusa Dina? Most authorities write that Dina DeMalchusa Dina is a rabbinic prohibition, but Lifnei Iver does apply to Rabbinic issues. Although most authorities also write that Dina DeMalchusa only applies to taxes and kinyanim, it can be argued that the Dina DeMalchusa Statute here (Nun Yud Choff Raish Raish: Siman Raish Chof Aleph) does apply to kinyanim.

Clearly, there may be some very serious prohibitions involved here.

So what are the solutions? One thing you can do is to make sure that you bag all your chocolates separately, then have them weighed, and then place them in the container that you purchased to be shrink-warpped. Another thing you can do is to mentally and or verbally forgive the inadvertent theft. What the store can do is to put a sign up by the scale that says, please note that the price you see may not be accurately reflected in your final purchase – since we average the price of all your chocolates.

Is this something that the Kashrus agency should be involved in? It is an issue that does not involve Kashrus per se, but involves other meta-halachic issues. Our Kashrus agencies do legislate in regard to closing in ample time before Shabbos, so why not include Lifnei Iver and Choshain Mishpat issues too? Indeed, the Ramvbam writes (in Hilchos Genaivah 8:20) that the Bais Din of the community is obligated to check the stores and make sure that the items are weighed honestly.

Le Marais

Mashgiach Wars and Halacha

By Yair Hoffman

“Oy It’s Kosher Combat” read the headline of the March 28^th New York Post.

Apparently, a certain Isaac Bitton, the former Mashgiach of the Le Marais restaurant in Manhattan, had presented to the OU allegations of purposeful kashrus misconduct at the restaurant by Mark Hennessey, the restaurant’s chef. The OU investigated the allegations and decided that there was no evidence backing up the Mashgiach’s allegations. They chose not to fire the chef. The Mashgiach quit.

The Mashgiach threatened to and ultimately went public with his accusations. The OU posted a letter defending its position[i]. The restaurant decided to sue the former Mashgiach for $10,000,000. The restaurant got a ruling from a state judge that the former Mashgiach must cease posting defamatory remarks against the restaurant. The Mashgiach’s family member said that he would not comply. A lawyer for Le Marais, Richard Klass, told the New York Post that “the allegations have cut business at the French kosher Midtown eatery by 30 percent.”

These are the basic facts. The question arises as to what the halacha says about all this. We know that there is a concept in halacha called “Aid echad ne-eman beissurin” – one witness is believed in regard to matters of prohibition. In other words, even though in matters of money and issues having to do with marriage and divorce the Torah requires the testimony of two witnesses, there are times when we do rely on the testimony of one witness.

The issue of one witness being believed is one of the underpinnings of the laws of Kashrus. While in commercial establishments, quite often Kashrus agencies do not rely on this when there are possibilities for financial gain on the part of the lone witness, we do rely on this in regard to many matters. It is necessary that the lone witness be a Sabbath observing Jew. When a Kashrus agency appoints a Mashgiach, it is using the concept of an Aid Echad. The Aid Echad is believed whether it is to permit or forbid food. There are questions in the Achronim as to whether the concept of Aid Echad is actually viewed as actual testimony or whether it is merely that the witness has a legal status of reliability[ii].

Yet here we have an incident where apparently the information provided by this first witness quite possibly did not check out with the words of another witness or witnesses. The Shach, discussing the laws of Yayin Nesach - wine that is poured by gentiles (Yoreh Deah 127:14) clearly states that when one witness is refuted by a second witness, the first witness is not believed. He backs this up by citing a responsa of the Rashba. Applying this Shach to our case, and assuming that the other witnesses interviewed by the OU have actually refuted the words of the first Mashgiach, then the OU’s position seems to be correct.

There is of course the possibility that the other witnesses are not actually refuting the words of the first Mashgiach, but merely not confirming his words. If this is the case, then the first mashgiach’s statements should be believed. Also, it is not clear as to with whom the OU actually spoke. Were they valid Aid echad witnesses or not?

There is also the possibility that the OU is using other types of evidence to counter the words of the Mashgiach. Depending upon the strength of this evidence, it may be an error or it may actually counter the testimony of the Aid Echad. Other types of evidence have a halachic status that can range between “very strong” – an “anan sahadi” to relatively weak.

There is, however, another position other than the Shach’s. The Bais Shmuel in Even HoEzer (42:7) reads the concept of one witness clashing with someone as referring not to another witness, but to the actual owner. If, however, the first witness clashes with another witness, the Bais Shmuel indicates that the first witness is believed. Rabbeinu Yerucham holds this very same position (Toldos Adam VeChava 23:3: p, 196) The Chazon Ish (EH 59:47) however, seems to disagree with the implication of the Bais Shmuel.

The signatures on the OU letter are all reputable Rabbinic figures, and it is assumed that the OU screens and hires only reputable, reliable, and respectable Mashgichim. It has also been alleged that certain kashrus threats (that may or may not have been made by the chef) may have not been serious but just out of anger and personality clash. If this turns out to be the case, then the OU should take steps to ensure that Kashrus issues should bnever be joked about.

It has been suggested that another trusted Kashrus agency should examine the Mashgiach’s allegations and make a determination as to whether any steps need to be taken or not. Kashrus Agencies often rely upon each other in regard to numerous matters, and it would be an effective manner in which to rebuild the alleged loss of business to the restaurant in question. This suggested protocol might be of benefit to Kashrus in general, not just in this case

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[i] The text of the OU letter dated March 22, 2007 reads as follows: A few months ago, a mashgiach at Le Marais restaurant, Mr. Isaac Bitton, alleged that on several occasions, one of the chefs at Le Marais intentionally compromised the kashrus at Le Marais, and that he had been fired from his previous employment for that very reason as well. Mr. Bitton insisted and demanded that the chef be fired.

Over a period of months the OU carefully researched and investigated every accusation, and we spoke to all parties whom Mr. Bitton claimed had information. Obviously, the presence of an individual who is hostile to our kosher program would seriously compromise our ability to provide reliable supervision. At the same time, fairness dictates that if allegations are made against a Jew or non-Jew, the accusations must be independently verified before one is dismissed from his position.

The OU found no evidence of intent to compromise kashrus by this chef. People quoted by Mr. Bitton resolutely denied statements attributed to them. For example, Mr. Bitton claimed the chef was fired from Levana for kashrus infractions, and the management would verify that this was the case. We spoke to the management of Levana and they emphatically stated that this was not true. Mr. Bitton then said a sister of the management would confirm his allegation. She too said she had no knowledge of this matter. Mr. Bitton then claimed that he secretly tape recorded a conversation with the sister and she admitted and confirmed that the chef was fired for Kashrus reasons. The OU staff listened to the tape and at no point did she confirm the above. Initially, she denied that the chef was fired for Kashrus violations. After Mr. Bitton relentlessly pressed the issue, she said he should pursue the matter further with the appropriate parties, if he so desired. Mr. Bitton maintained that not denying the allegation was tantamount to confirming it. We considered it a misrepresentation to characterize this as a confirmation.

Other individuals who worked closely with the chef, such as the second Mashgiach at Le Marais, gave no support to the allegations. With the exception of Mr. Bitton, everyone found the chef to be cooperative.
.
Mr. Bitton was dogmatic in his interpretations of situations and did not acknowledge the legitimacy of other opinions. We explained to Mr. Bitton that he was entitled to his opinion, but we do not have to agree. He insisted that his viewpoint is fact and not an opinion.

For example, in one instance the chef purchased dairy margarine for the restaurant (though it was caught before it was used). There is no evidence that the chef did not make an honest error. Indeed, the OU receives numerous calls from people who accidentally used OUD margarine in a meat dish. Mr. Bitton insisted the chef bought the product with malicious intent. In another case, a delivery of non-kosher fish (which was also not used) was dropped off at the restaurant over Shabbos while the store was closed. Mr. Bitton insisted that the chef made the order, though there was no evidence linking the chef to the order, and the fish company advised the OU that the delivery was made in error to the wrong customer. Once again, Mr. Bitton maintained that his interpretation was a fact and not an opinion.

Mr. Bitton threatened to make a public expose of this “cover-up”. The OU took a principled position and did not acquiesce to threats and intimidation.

[ii] See Chevas Daas YD 185 as to whether there is the limitation of “chozer UMagid” going back and retestifying regarding one witness. See also responsa Bais Shearim 214 and Shev Shmaytsa 7.

Transfats and Halacha

Trans fats, Halacha and the Jewish Response

By Yair Hoffman

The latest data on trans fats is pretty shocking. Apparently a study was performed on the eating habits of a large group of nurses and the results were presented at the annual meeting of the American Heart Association. In fact, the president of the AHA, who is a professor at the Mayo Clinic supports a nationwide ban.

What are trans fats? Trans fat is generally an artificially made fat where manufacturers add hydrogen to vegetable oil--a process called hydrogenation. Hydrogenation both increases the shelf life and flavor stability of foods that contain these fats. It tastes very very good.

Trans fats are found in vegetable shortenings, some margarines, crackers, cookies, snack foods, and other foods made with or fried in partially hydrogenated oils. A small amount of trans fat is found naturally, primarily in some animal-based foods. Trans fats were completely banned in Denmark, with the results of remarkable health benefits throughout the country.

So what are the results of the study? Those nurses that ate the most trans fats were three times more likely to develop heart disease than those nurses that ate the least amount. The study was one of the first to actually use real fat level in blood data rather than questionnaires.

The question is, when a pressing health issue is uncovered, what is our track record? When the dangers of smoking and second hand smoke became apparent, did the Torah community respond quickly? Unfortunately, not. A story is told about a Lakewood Kollel yungerman who was told in no uncertain terms by his doctor, after seeing an X-ray of his lungs - that he must stop smoking. The Kollel man responded, “But doctor, I don’t smoke!” It was only then that the dangers of second-hand smoke prompted pretty much every Yeshiva to ban smoking in the Bais HaMidrash.

Another question is how healthy are our Yeshiva lunches? After years of research on healthy eating do our Yeshivos still serve hot dogs, pasta and cheese, pizza, French fries and hamburgers? Do we still allow all sorts of nosh for snack and do we still have soda machines? The answer, unfortunately, is yes. [Although to our credit, some local Yeshivos have actually banned these items – successfully.]

The truth of the matter is that, notwithstanding numerous Torah sources to the contrary, the Torah community is unfortunately kind of slow in responding to health-related issues.

A mere cursory examination of the way halacha views health, would lead us to the clear conclusion that trans fats should be prohibited. There is an entire chapter of Shulchan Aruch (YD 115) dedicated to dangerous eating habits- ranging from coin sucking drinking uncovered drinks. There are another few subparagraphs about it in the Choshain Mishpat section of Shulchan Aruch (127).

Of course the best preventative medicine is adherence to Torah and Mitzvos, as we in many verses throughout the Torah: (Shmos 15:26): He (Moshe) said, "If you listen carefully to the voice of Hashem and do what is right in His eyes..I will not bring on you any of the diseases I brought on the Egyptians, for I am Hashem who heals you."

(Shmos 23:25) “You shall serve Hashem and He will bless your bread and your water, and take sickness away from your midst.”

The Torah verse (Dvarim 22:8) that tells us to place on our rooftops a protective fence (a parapet) is actually used by the Gemorah as a general source to obligate us in preventing dangers and dangerous situations. The Talmud Ksuvos 41b uses this verse to tell us that it is forbidden to keep a dangerous dog and a ruined ladder in the house. The Torah Temimah on the verse writes that although preventing dangers is clearly a fulfillment of the verse, a blessing is only recited on actually putting up the parapet fence (Maakeh).

The Rambam in Hilchos Deos 3:2 writes: ”One should take care to eat and drink only in

order to be healthy in body and limb. One should not eat all that one desires like a dog

or donkey. Rather, one must eat items that are beneficial for the body, whether they be bitter or sweet. Conversely, one should avoid eating what is harmful to the body, even though it may be sweet to the palate.”

The Torah tells us “Vayehi adam lenefesh Chaya (Bereishis 2:7)” – The Talmud (Taanis 22b) quotes Rav Yehuda saying in the name of Rav: The Torah says in this verse, The soul that I gave you, - chaya – make sure that it lives.” This would seem to be a general admonition to eat healthy.

The Rambam Hilchos Rotzayach and Shmiras HaNefesh (11:5) says that a violation of these things warrants makas mardus – a Bais Din sanctioned whipping.

The question arises, however, as to whether these Gemorahs are really a biblical prohibition or are they just a Rabbinic obligation couched in terms of a Biblical prohibition. This is known as an Asmachta. At times, the Rabbis will exaggerate a Rabbinic prohibition to show us how serious we should take the item (for example, Tosfos says that the issue of Bracha Levatalah is actually a Rabbinic prohibition and not a biblical one).

The Beer HaGoleh in the very last siman of Choshain Mishpat (127:70) is unsure whether the prohibition of danger-laden food items is Rabbinic or Biblical.

Another interesting question that needs to be explored is why is it that we have not been careful about these halachos? There are possibly a number of reasons.

The first is Taavah –desire. Trans fats and other food-like vices taste good. This affects the way we conduct ourselves. If the Midrash tells us that Yitzchok Avinu was affected by the food items that Aisav gave to him – and was thus unable to fully perceive Aisav’s wickedness – then we can well understand this phenomenon.

Another cause is what can only be described as social resistance to change. Even though we know that halacha dictates X, we still do Y because that is what everyone else is doing. For example, in the forties and fifties, many normative orthodox Jewish households did not observe the laws of “saar b’isha ervah”- and this may be another manifestation of this concept.

So practically what do we do?

The U.S. FDA has some practical tips that can be used to keep our consumption of saturated fat, trans fat, and cholesterol low while still consuming a nutritionally adequate diet. Below is an adaptation of these recommendations

• Check the Nutrition Facts panel to compare foods because the serving sizes are generally consistent in similar types of foods. Choose foods lower in saturated fat, trans fat, and cholesterol. For saturated fat and cholesterol, keep in mind that 5 percent of the Daily Value (%DV) or less is low and 20 percent or more is high. (There is as of yet no %DV for trans fat.)
• Choose alternative fats. Replace saturated and trans fats in your diet with monounsaturated and polyunsaturated fats. These fats do not raise LDL cholesterol levels and have health benefits when eaten in moderation. Sources of monounsaturated fats include olive and canola oils. Frum companies such as Nutola do produce Canola oil. They are available in our local supermarkets. Sources of polyunsaturated fats include soybean oil, corn oil, sunflower oil and foods like nuts.
• Choose vegetable oils (except coconut and palm kernel oils) and soft margarines (liquid, tub, or spray) more often because the combined amount of saturated fat and trans fat is lower than the amount in solid shortenings, hard margarines, and animal fats, including butter.
• Consider fish. Most fish are lower in saturated fat than meat. Some fish, such as mackerel, sardines, and salmon, contain omega-3 fatty acids, which are being studied to determine if they offer protection against heart disease.
• Choose lean meats, such as poultry without the skin and not fried and lean beef not fried, with visible fat trimmed.
• Ask before you order when eating out. A good tip to remember is to ask which fats are being used in the preparation of your food when eating or ordering out.
• Limit foods high in cholesterol such as liver and other organ meats, egg yolks, and full-fat dairy products, like whole milk.
• Choose foods low in saturated fat such as fat free or 1% dairy products, lean meats, fish, skinless poultry, whole grain foods, and fruits and vegetables.

Bitul Chometz - A Brief History

Bitul Chometz – A Brief History

By Yair Hoffman

According to Torah law we can dispose of our Chometz before Pesach either by Biur- destruction or by Bitul – negation. By Rabbinic law we must do both. We are all familiar with the text, we recite it in the evening after the search for Chometz, and again in the morning while we burn it.

What is perhaps shocking is that no where in the Babylonian Talmud is this formulation found. There is certainly an obligation to annul the Chometz, but it seems from the Gemorah (See Psachim 6b) that this is a thinking process that did not necessarily have to be verbalized. The Ramban actually rules that one does not require a verbal declaration (See Ramban, Psachim 7a, 31b^[1]). The Jerusalem Talmud (Psachim 2:2), however, states just the opposite. There, Rav is quoted as ruling that one must recite the formula “All Chometz that is in my house that I am not aware of shall be annulled.”

The Rosh and the Rif, however, explain our Gemorah as stating that the annulment does require an actual verbal formulation. They differ slightly as to the verbal formula. There are actually four changes:

1] The first change is that the entire formula is no longer in the clear Hebrew that we find in the Jerusalem Talmud. The formula is now in Aramaic.

2] Another change is that the words in my house are now changed to in my domain.

3] The wording “that I am not aware of” is also changed to “That I have seen or have not seen, that I have destroyed or have not destroyed.”

4] In addition, the Rif adds the words “shall be annulled like dust” while the Rosh adds “shall be annulled like dust of the earth.”

Where did these changes come from and who made them? The Rishonim all point to the previous generation of Torah scholars – the Gaonim.

The reason for the first change is the subject of debate. The Ramah in his Darchei Moshe writes that it was for masses of people that were not fluent in Hebrew. During the times of the Gaonim, Aramaic was the prevalent language understood by all. Rav Yosef Teomim, however, in his commentary on the Mogen Avrohom cites the Ohr Zarua as stating an entirely different reason. The Gaonim were concerned with the effects that destroying bread, upon which man subsides, could have upon people. Had the annulment of bread been stated in Hebrew – an important language, the import of bread in the eyes of the people would be diminished. [As a parenthetic note, This explanation underscores the remarkable sensitivity and appreciation that the Torah desires us to develop within ourselves.] The Vilna Gaon adds that Chamira is not merely an Aramaic translation of the Hebrew term Chometz, it encompasses both Chometz and Seor^[2].

There is another reason cited for the change to Aramaic. The Eliyahu Rabbah cites the reason that the Mazikim - negative spiritual forces - would understand it in Hebrew and would attack. We thus recite it in Aramaic so that they will be unaware of it. [One could perhaps ask that the Zohar in Parshas Trumah 129b indicates that negative spiritual forces do understand Aramaic too].

The second change simply extended the boundaries of what the formulation applied to. Now it was no longer just limited to the house but included the Babylonian office buildings and ancient camelpacks (somewhat akin to the modern car trunk).

The third change clearly adds the incompetent burners on the morning of Erev Pesach who mess up on destroying the Chometz. They mess up by either not taking the bread out of the foil or including too much Chometz or simply not attempting to burn it thoroughly.

The fourth change perhaps more vividly illustatres to the reciter of the formula what annulment actually means. The Gaonim could have felt that the term annulment may have been too abstract a concept to the average Jew and thus provided a more detailed and vivid understanding of it by including the words like dust or like the dust of the earth.

Another question that exists in regard to the annulment is whether the Bitul can be annulled through a Shliach, through a messenger^[3]. The Baal HaIttur holds that since a messenger is like the person throughout the entire Torah, a messenger can annul the Chometz of someone who sent him. The Rashba, the Ritva and the Nimukei Yoseph disagree and write that the actual owner of the Chometz must be the one who annuls it. The TaZ rules in accordance with the lenient opinion and states that someone who does utlize a messenger to annul, in all probability, has a reason for it. He is concerned that he may become busy or simply forget to annul it. His father-in-law, the Bach, however, was stringent.

From a drasha point of view, we know that Chazal explain that Chometz also represents the specific Yetzer HaRah of consumption. Perhaps the Rabbinic requirement to perform both Bitul and Biur can reflect the idea that we need every tool possible in which to battle this Yetzer HaRah. We should work to destroy the proclivity toward it within us. There is also another approach. We should ignore and negate it too. In this manner we can achieve the true freedom inherent in the Pesach holiday as defined by the Alter of Slabodka, the freedom from the slavery of consumptive desires to do that which Hashem truly desires of us.

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^[1] However, the Ritvah understood his Rebbe the Ramban that he also meant an actual verbal declaration is required. Rav Dovid Bonfid, another student of the Ramban understands his Rebbe in its simplere implication.

^[2] Seor is actually, little know in our baking circles, but it was a leaven that was kept by bakers and added to the dough to cause it to rise. Now we just simple use pure yeast.

^[3] In an entirely unrelated thought, Rabbi Dr. Abraham Twersky was once asked by an alcoholic priest what he should do regarding partaking of the Christian sacraments of the wine and wafers. Rabbi Dr. Twersky responded, aren’t your sacraments based on the Jewish Passover? Well grape juice is permitted to be used instead of wine on Passover. The priest said that he would ask his supervisors in the Vatican. The end of the incident was that the Vatican requested the priest to provide the Jewish sources that permitted the use of grape juice. Rabbi Twersky promptly forwarded to the Vatican Rav Moshe Feinstein’s responsa on grape juice use, and the Vatican issued a lenient ruling. Perhaps the leniency described above regarding a messenger for Bitul Chometza could in a similar sense be used to allow the use of messengers to procure marriage annulments from the Vatican as well, instead of personal petitions.

In Search of Pharoah

In Search of Pharoah

By Yair Hoffman

The Gemorah in Psachim (116b) informs us that in each generation we are obligated to view ourselves as if we actually left Mitzrayim. Indeed, in Michtav MeEliyahu, Rav Dessler writes that since time does not progress linearly, but rather travels in a carousel like circle, the 15^th of Nissan of the year 2448 is actually the very same 15^th of Nissan of our own year now.

This is one of our obligations on the night of Pesach. This being the case, that halachically we must view ourselves as actually leaving Mitzrayim, in our mind’s eye we should envision and picture the escape. Let’s give it a try. Before us, standing at the water’s edge about to enter stands Nachshon Ben Aminadav. Behind us, on a chariot, Pharoah is leading his hordes of well trained soldiers. They are rapidly catching up. Yes, Pharoah the short, obnoxious leader of the Egyptians that dared to present himself as a god.

But who exactly was he? What was his name? What do we know about him?

In the 77^th chapter of a work called Sefer HaYashar, which was first printed in Venice in 1525, there are details as to what his name was, and more about who he may have been. [Alter Bergmann published a more recent edition of it in Tel Aviv]. The author of this Sefer HaYashar is anonymous, and there seems to be a debate as to whether it was written in the times of the Tannaim or a much later compilation.

So what do we know about him according to the Sefer HaYashar? Well, apparently he took the throne at the age of twenty. His father Melol was sick for the last ten years of his life, but had reigned for 94 years. His name was Adikam Ahuz. In Egyptian, according to the Sefer HaYashar, Ahuz means short, and short he was. He was an Ammah and one half, exceedingly ugly, and had a beard down to his feet. [One perhaps could best picture him as one of the seven dwarfs a la Snow White, but with a crown instead of a nightcap]. The Sefer HaYashar states that his reign started in the 206^th year of Israel’s going down to Mitzrayim, so he reigned for four years.

It seems, by the way, from the Sefer HaYashar that only his advisors and confidants appended the pejorative Ahuz apelation to his name [the modern equivalent of shorty]. His subjects called him Adikam.

Is the Sefer HaYashar reliable? Good question. Looking through the work we do find some interesting tidbits of information that do not seem to have other parallels in our extant Midrashic Ouvre. For example, Tzipporah, Moshe Rabbeinu’s wife is described as being on par with the Imahos, Sara, Rivkah, Rochel and Leah. Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan z”l does use the work in his Chumash, and there are many parallels in other Midrashim and Gemorahs. Let’s assume that it is reliable.

Let’s now ask another question. Secular historians have all the Pharoahs named. What is the secular name of Pharoah? It is possible to accept the secular name and the surrounding history as accurate without necessarily having to accept the secular chronology as accurate. If we follow the standard dating, of when the old Pharoah (Basya’s father) died and a new Pharoah arose (See Shmos 2:23) which occurred in 2444, this gives us the figure of 1316 BCE. The Pharoah at that time was called Horemheb according to secular historians.

The name of one of the cities that Klal Yisroel built was Ramses (See Shmos 1:11). It might be tempting to accept Ramses II as the Pharoah. But his secular dating is much later 1134 BCE. Nonetheless, the thesis presented earlier might be acceptable that there was a mess up in their dating, somehow.

If we follow the 166 year discrepancy (or 163 years according to Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan) then the Pharoah is Thutmose III. Who according to the secular calculation reigned from 1490-1436 BCE.

There is another possibility as well^[1]. It seems that there was a Pharoah known as Phiops II or Pepi who is mentioned by Manetho. Manetho, an Egyptian priest from Heliopolis. Compiled an Egyptian history under the patronage of Ptolemy I, entitled Aegyptika. It was written in Greek and finished c.271 BCE. It is now only extant in translation and is available to us in Josephus. According to Manetho, Pepi ruled from age six to age one hundred. Manetho’s datings have been questioned by historians who claim that there was political gain for the Egyptian priest in extending the lengths. However, the account has been verified through an Egyptian papyrus discovered in 1822 called the Turin Royal Canon. (See Alan Gardiner, Royal Canon of Turin. Griffith Institute, 1959) [Parenthetically, The Turin papyrus dates to Ramses II and mentions the names of all Egyptian rulers preceded by the register of the “gods” who ruled over Egypt before the Pharaonic era. It was discovered in Thebes by an Italian traveler named Bernardino Drovetti. Eventually it was donated to the Museo Egizio by the king of Sardinia.]

There is another advantage to this approach, since the Ipuwer papyrus is now remarkably on mark. The Dialogue of Ipuwer is an ancient Egyptian poem preserved in a single papyrus, Leiden Papyrus I 344. It is now housed in the National Archeological Museum in Leiden, Netherlands. In general there is a debate as to whether Ipuwer was just being figurative or descriptive, for more information see Egyptian Literature 1800BC: Questions and Readings, London 2004, by Stephen Quirke . But the parallels to Yetzias Mitzrayim are stunning.

2:5-6 Plague is throughout the land. Blood is everywhere. 2:10 The river is blood. 2:10 Men shrink from tasting - human beings, and thirst after water 3:10-13 That is our water! That is our happiness! What shall we do in respect thereof? All is ruin. 7:20 …all the waters of the river were turned to blood. 7:21 ...there was blood thoughout all the land of Egypt …and the river stank. 7:24 And all the Egyptians dug around the river for water to drink; for they could not drink of the water of the river. 2:10 Forsooth, gates, columns and walls are consumed by fire. 10:3-6 Lower Egypt weeps... The entire palace is without its revenues. To it belong [by right] wheat and barley, geese and fish 6:3 Forsooth, grain has perished on every side. 5:12 Forsooth, that has perished which was yesterday seen. The land is left over to its weariness like the cutting of flax.

3:2 Gold and lapis lazuli, silver and malachite, carnelian and bronze... are fastened on the neck of female slaves. 4:3 (5:6) Forsooth, the children of princes are dashed against the walls. 6:12 Forsooth, the children of princes are cast out in the streets. 2:13 He who places his brother in the ground is everywhere. 3:14 It is groaning throughout the land, mingled with lamentations..

There is also one more tidbit. According to the Seforno Tzefardaya means crocodiles not frogs. The Ipuwer papyrus mentions crocodiles coming out of the nile left and right on a path of destruction.

The halacha of envisioning us being there is not just theoretical. It involves physical action as well. The Rambam writes (Hilchos Chometz UhMatzah 7:6) based upon the verse in Dvarim 5, “And you shall remember that you were a slave in Mitzrayim” as follows: “In other words, as if you yourself were a slave and you left to freedom and you were redeemed.” The juxtaposition of this Rambam with the next halacha gives us remarkable insight. The Rambam writes ,”Therefore when a person eats and drinks on this night he must lean in the manner of free men.” In other words it seems that the obligation of leaning is a manifestation of this biblical obligation of imagining and visioning that it was actually us. So this Pesach let us go through the extra effort of picturing it with even more detail. A short, ugly Pharoah named Adikam Ahuz chasing us in a chariot.

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^[1] Mentioned also in a Jewish Action Magazine a number of years ago.

Kitniyos: A Brief Overview

Kitniyos: A Brief Overview

By Yair Hoffman

Dean, Tiferet Chaya–The Carol Tepler High School for Girls

It is known as the great Ashkenazic-Sephardic divide; the details are found in Chapter 423 of the Orach Chayim section of the Shulchan Aruch. We are, of course, referring to kitniyos.

The minhag to not eat kitniyos (often defined as "legumes") on Pesach dates back to the times of the Geonim (see SMaK 222). During the time of the Gemara, the prohibition did not exist. Indeed, the Gemara tells us that Rabbah ate rice in front of Rav Huna ( Pesachim 114b). Rav Ashi also rules that rice may be eaten on Pesach. But clearly, in the time of the Geonim things changed.

The reason why kitniyos were forbidden, of course, was as a protective measure. The Mishnah Berurah (O.C. 453:6, 464:5) provides a few explanations:

1) Kitniyos are harvested and processed in the same way that chametz is. The masses would confuse the two and come to permit grains for themselves. (2) Kitniyos can also be ground and baked, just like chametz, and people might come to permit chametz grains. (3) The Kitniyos themselves may have actual chametz mixed in. All three reasons are therefore protective in nature. The prohibition was strictly limited to consumption; one may own and derive benefit from Kitniyos on Pesach.

Just what is included in kitniyos? The term "legumes" is a misnomer, as that word simply means a plant in the family Fabaceae (or Leguminosae), or the edible fruit or seeds of such plants, such as beans and peas. The prohibition extended beyond just legumes, however. Rice, mustard, and corn (see M.B. 453:4) are also included. So are buckwheat, lentils, and sesame seeds. The TaZ writes that it is simply impossible to clearly define and quantify what is included in the category.

What about coffee? Is that a bean? The Shaarei Teshuvah forbids coffee as kitniyos. And what about peanuts? Some say yes, some say no.

And why are we so stringent regarding derivatives of kitniyos? This comes from a halachah found in the Rama: the Rama indicates that oil made from kitniyos is forbidden just like the kitniyos themselves. Cottonseed oil is perplexing, because some say yes and some say no. Canola oil is kitniyos, too.

When are kitniyos forbidden? The Sheivet HaLevi (Vol. III, No. 31) rules that the time we can no longer eat them is the same time as for chametz itself. The Maharsham (Daas Torah 453) permits it, though???. The minhag is to be stringent, but for those direct descendents of the Maharsham (quite a few of whom live in Lawrence), it would be okay [to eat kitniyos on erev Pesach???].

There is also a leniency. Kitniyos is battul b'rov if mixed in accidentally with other (kosher l'Pesach) food (see Mishnah Berurah 453:9). In other words, even if the taste is distinguishable, as long as the kitniyos constitutes less than half of the final mixture and is not removable, the food remains kosher! The Rav Shulchan Aruch says that this doesn't work if it is the main part of the dish, though—even when less than half.

Sick people may also eat kitniyos on Pesach, and it is permitted to feed kitniyos to infants or to animals. The Chasam Sofer writes (O.C. 122) not to let it cook a long time in the pot, but rather to heat up the water first and then put in the kitniyus (which is what we do anyway, except when using a rice cooker). Ideally, if one is feeding someone kitniyos, a separate pot should be kept for that use (P'ri Chadash 453). There is no need to kasher, though, if an error was made.

When a couple gets married, the wife follows the customs of the husband. So a Sephardic girl who marries an Ashkenazic boy cannot have kitniyos, while an Ashkenazic girl who marries a Sephardic boy may have kitniyos. This is true for a second marriage, as well.

Another question: Is the prohibition of kitniyos here to stay? The Teshuvah MeAhavah (No. 259) seems to indicate that it is. He writes that even if the beis din of Shmuel HaRamasi or Eliyahu HaNavi were to reconvene, they would not have the ability to permit kitniyos. And, at least according to some poskim, it is a pretty serious prohibition; the Maharil (Hilchos Pesach 25) writes that violating the minhag can cause one to be put to death!

But why all the stringencies? Why do we forbid so many things—and their derivatives, as well? Why on erev Pesach, too? Perhaps a philosophical approach to kitniyos can answer a lot of our questions. One reason, given by the father of Koznitz Hagaddah's publisher (found in the Nuta Gavriel), is that the word alludes to a notion that means small, while Pesach is associated with things that are great.

To elaborate a bit, kitniyos represents something which is the antithesis of Pesach. Of all the holidays on the Jewish calendar, Pesach connotes greatness—a realization of who we are as a nation, and a concomitant recognition that Hashem had great purpose in redeeming us from the hand of Pharaoh. Within the small nation of Israel lies cosmic significance with a national spiritual destiny that can affect the world. Pesach connotes geulah, redemption, with all the overtones implied in the word.

Kitniyos

, on the other hand, alludes to smallness ("kattan"= "small") The word conjures up thoughts of a myopic, small-mindedness of sorts, where the cosmic significance and the national destiny of the Jewish people is ignored. Everything that we do has import, even down to the foods we eat or the foods that we do not eat. Perhaps we are so stringent in avoiding kitniyos to help us dispose of the small-mindedness that can get us stuck into just looking at the trees without seeing the forest. For the same reason, the community of the town of Ostreich refrain from eating kitniyos on any day on which Tachanun is not recited (see Be'er Heitev O.C. 131, citing the Maharil). The reason? Also, to appeal to the inner voice within us to achieve our destiny, both as a people and as individuals. v

The author can be reached at vze37jka@verizon.net.

The Halachos of Grammar

The Halachos of Grammar

By Yair Hoffman

A young girl from Borough Park approaches a religious Jewish man and asks, “Can you cross me the street?”

A Kollel Yungerman presents a remarkable Talmudic discourse after Kaballas Shabbos services in shul and begins with the words.. “The Rambam brings down a halacha..”

What do these two people have in common?

Grammar – or rather, the lack of it.

Does it make a difference, however?

It seems that it actually does. A verse in Nechemiah (13:24) castigates a group of people for their lack of language skills. “VeAinam makirim ledaber yehudis uchilshon am veam – And they do not know how to speak Hebrew and like the language of every nation. It seems that there is a debate as to how to understand the last three words of this verse. According to the Rambam (Hilchos Tefillah 1:4) and the Nodah BiYehudah the words are to be understood in the following sense. These people were neither able to speak Hebrew nor any other language fully. The vov is connective and the verse is then rendered as “And they do not know how to speak [neither ] Hebrew and the language of other nations. According to other commentators the prophet is castigating them just for being unable to speak Hebrew.

The Rambam is consistent with this position elsewhere too. In Hilchos Krias Shma (2:10) he writes: A person may read the Shma in any language that he understands. One who reads it in another language must be careful not to make grammatical errors in that language, and must be as careful in its grammar as he is in the Holy Tongue.

The Gemorah in Sanhedrin (17a) tells us that each member of the Sanhedrin was fluent in seventy languages.

The reasons for the need to express oneself in a grammatically proper fashion are pretty intuitive. It is necessary for communication. It is also necessary to convey precise meanings and nuances. A proper understanding of grammar allows one to understand things better as well. For example, in Lashon HaKodesh once can get a better understanding of both Chumash and Gemorah if one is well versed in the grammatical aspects of the language. A good grasp of grammar also leaves a person with a better ability toretain information.

Yet another reason for expressing oneself with proper grammatical form is in the way we are looked upon by others. Quite often it is also the way in which other people judge us. As a final reason, many Achronim have also ruled that the misuse of grammar manifests a subtle lack of emes, the quality of Truth.

There is a fascinating incident in which Rabbi Moshe Isserles’s cousin, Rabbi Shlomo Luria (known as the Maharshal) took Rabbi Isserles (the Ramah) to task for what appeared to be errors in grammar in his Darchei Moshe and Ramah. The Ramah replied that they were not errors in grammar since that was already the common usage.

All this of course is whether there is a requirement to use proper dikduk and grammar in languages other than Hebrew and in other written forms. However, in daveining and in the recitation of brachos, all authorities agree that it is important to pronounce words properly and to express oneself in a grammatically correct form.

In Hebrew grammar there are the Beged Kefet letters – the letters that at time have a dagesh, a dot mark that indicates that the letter is stressed. The general rule is that if the previous syllable ends with a letter tha leaves the mouth open the next begged kefet letter loses its dagesh. Thus in the posuk Ki mitzion taitzay sorah the tof immediately following Tzion retains its dagesh because the nun in Tzion ends with the mouth closed (notice that your tongue is touching the top of your mouth). However, the Tof in Sorah (otherwise Torah) has lost its dagesh since the previous word “taytzay” ended with an ay – with the mouth open.

This explanation leads us with the conclusion that in the blessings of Borei Pri HoAitz and Borei Pri HaAdamah the word should really be pronounced “fri” rather than “pri” since the previous word was borei ending with the mouth open. Indeed this is the position of Rabbi Ben Tzion Abba Shaul, that the word should be pronounced “fri.” Rabbi Ovadiah Yoseph in Yavia Omer Volume IX #22 disagrees with Rav Ben Tzion Abbah Shaul and says that when the word is intimately connected to the next word the what should be done is to create a pause between the previous word and the begged kefet word so that the word will still retain its natural dagesh. Thus Rav Ovadia Yoseph advocates that a slight pause be inserted between the words borei and pri.

[One of the primary purposes of Brachos is the expression of hakaros HaTov, expressing appreciation. Since we discussing both brachos and the idea of expressing oneself with proper grammar it is particularly appropriate now to express appreciation for the fine work of the editorial staff, Reb Shmuel Gerber and his staff for the wonderful job that they do in correcting the grammar in these articles.]

The same issue applies to the pronunciation of the Kaddish. The words BeAlma di vra chirusay (or kirusay) have the same issue. Rav Ovadiah Yoseph states that the word kirusay is actually modifying Yisgadal VeYiskadahs rather than it being associated with BeAlma di vra. He, therefore, advocates that one pause after the word vra and then pronounce kirusay with its full dagesh.

One last issue the idea of milail and milrah, which syllable is stressed in the pronumnciation of Hebrew words. Ideally, words in Hebrew are pronounced emphasizing the last syllable, while English words, in general, emphasize the first syllable. Thus the standard pronunciation of Gut Shabbos is actually incorrect. It should emphasize the last syllable (as in Shabuuuss not Shaaabus). At times the incorrect stress could actually change the meaning, such as in the word Veahavta in Shma. Stressing the latter syllable means and you shall love whereas stressing the earlier syllable means “and you have loved” in the past tense.

It is important in all this to have the proper motivation in all this and not just to be an anti-social annoying grammar stickler. The main motivation that we should have in all this of course is that exercising proper grammar in all languages allows us to serve Hashem better. The ultimate ideal is to be a true eved Hashem.